Purpose. Virtually all eyewitnesses to ac rime, who eventually testify in court, are interviewed by police officers at least once.H ow do these interviews affect what the eyewitnesses aresubsequently likely to report? The purpose of this study is to compare the relativei mpact of self-versus other-generated misinformation on confabulated memorya bout an event. Self-generated misinformation can occur by encouraging eyewitnesses to guess or speculate about possible answers to questions about which they report having no memory. Other-generated misinformation can occur by having an investigator suggest an answer to an eyewitness.
interviewed by the police. There were numerous opportunities forcross-contamination of witnessmemory.Infact, the investigation was obstructed by the fact that the initial police bulletins contained information obtained from witnesses that waslater dismissed when avideo of the incident was reviewed. It turned out that many of these errorswere the result of witnessm emoryc ontagion. Further, photographs of the suspected perpetrator were circulated 3d ays aftert he assassination. Granhag, Ask, and Rebelius (2005) interviewed 29 witnesses to the assassination and reportedthat descriptions of the perpetrator obtained after publication of the pictures were significantlym ore accurate (i.e. theybetter matched the video) than those obtained prior to publicationof the pictures,evidencing another source of witnessmemory contagion.
Numerous studies have demonstratedthat eyewitnesses can be misled by post-event suggestions following an observede vent (Loftus, 1975; Loftus,M iller,&Burns, 1978; Pezdek, 1977; Pezdek &Blandon-Gitlin, 2005) . In most of this research, the post-event information has been other-generated,for example, the information in an interviewer's questions aboutane vent or an arrative that followed viewing an event. Conversations among co-witnesses is another potential source of forensically relevant other-generated suggestion (Gabbert, Memon, &W right, 2006; Wright, Self, &J ustice, 2000) .Afew studiesh aved emonstratedt hat self-generated post-eventi nformationc an also suggestivelyi nfluence eventm emory ( Hastie, Landsman, &L oftus, 1978; Schreiber, Wentura, &B ilsky,2 001; Zaragoza, Payment, Ackil, Drivdahl, &B eck, 2001) .
The purpose of this study is to compare the relative impact of self-versus othergenerated misinformation on confabulated memoryaboutanevent. Thisisanimportant issue because the researchonother-generated post-event information is often generalized to particular real world situations that are more likely to involveself-generated post-event information.T hese situations include, fore xample, the affect of speculation on the accuracy of eyewitnesses' memory,a nd the role of imagination as ac atalyst forf alse memories. There may be important constraints on the extent to which the researchon other-generated post-event information can be generalized to self-generated post-event information,yet there is little researchspecifically investigating this issue. Pezdek,S perry, andO wens (2007) recently examined whetheri nformationi sm ore likely to be incorporated into memory if it is (a)spontaneously self-generated or (b)forcibly self-generated,for examplebypressingeyewitnessestoanswer questionsabout events that they areunsureof. Participants viewed acrimevideo andthenanswered answerable and unanswerable questions. Thoseinthe 'voluntary guess' conditionhad an 'I don'tknow' response option,s oi ft heya nsweredaquestion,i tw as considered 'volunteered'. Participants in the'forced guess' conditiondid nothavethe 'I don'tknow'responseoption, so they were forced to providea na nswer to each question. Onew eekl ater thes ame questionswereanswered with an 'I don'tknow' option availablefor everyone.Information self-generated from forced confabulationattime1waslesslikelytoberepeatedattime2 than information that hadb eenv oluntarily self-generated.F urther,w hent he same answer wasgiven to an unanswerable question both times, theconfidence expressedinthe answer increased over time in both theforced andthe voluntaryguess conditions.
The results of Pezdek et al. (2007) are forensically relevant because virtually all eyewitnesses to crimes,who eventually testify in court, areinterviewed by police officers at least once, and more typically,multiple times (Cutler &Penrod, 1995; Poole &White, 1995) .Guidelines forforensic interviewing warn police officersabout the potential for suggestivelyinfluencing witnessmemorybythe wording of their questions (see Memon &B ull, 1999; Milne &B ull, 1999 , fore xtensive reviews of this literature). This type of suggestion -other-generated confabulation -can be induced by having an investigator suggest to an eyewitness what the answer to aquestion might be ('The othereyewitness said that the car at the end of the alleywas white. What colour do youthink the car was?').
Less is known, however,a bout the suggestive effect of encouraging witnesses to speculate answerst oq uestions.I fe ncouraging eyewitnesses to guess answers or speculate about possible answerst oq uestions about which theyr eporth aving no memoryl eads to false confabulation, forensic interviewers should also be advised against pressing witnesses to answer questions under these circumstances; these circumstances could produce self-generated false confabulations. In this study we compared the relative impact of self-versus other-generated suggestion on memory confabulations. No data exist documenting how frequently officersi nr eal police interviews press an eyewitness to answer questions after the eyewitness indicates that he or she does not know the answer to the question. However,G udjonsson (1992) , Kassin (1997) ,and Leo (1996) have reported that this is not an unusual practice.They reportedt hat eyewitnesses are often pressedt od escribe events that the interviewer believed occurred, even when witnesses report that theycannotremember the event or reportt hat theyd id not even witnesst he event. False confessions commonly occur under similar circumstances.
In this study,the methodologyofP ezdek et al. (2007) was replicated, however,the post-event information was either self-generated by each participant or other-generated in the questions presented. This study assesses event memoryand specifically compares ther elative impact of self-generated versuso ther-generatedm isinformationo n subsequent recall. In most suggestibility studies, the focus is on how memoryf or information that was actually presented is affected by post-event suggestion. In this study,w es pecifically focus on individuals'a nswerst ou nanswerable questions about information that was not actually presented in the video. If ap articipant answersa n unanswerable question, we know that the information in his or hera nswer was confabulated, because it was not presented in the video.
Methods

Participants and design
One hundred forty-four participants volunteered in eight psychology classes in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. This was a2(forced guess vs. voluntaryguess condition) £ 2 (self-vs. other-generated) £ 2(time 1vs. time 2) mixed factorial design with the first two variables manipulated between participants.
Materialsa nd procedure Individuals participated with their classmates in two 15 minutes sessions, 1week apart,in their psychology class.Inthe first session, participants viewed a5minutes video of acarjacking (produced forthe study by Clark &Tunnicliff, 2001 , and also the same video used by Pezdek et al.,2 007). Participants weret oldt op ay very close attention to the video because afterwardt heyw ould be asked some questions.T he video was followed immediately by 22 open-ended questions including 16 answerable and 6unanswerable questions.T he questions werep rovided in writing;p articipants provided answersi n writing as well. The questions used in this study are identical to those used by Pezdek et al. (2007) and are included in the Appendix. Answerable questions probedinformation that was presented in the video; unanswerable questions probedinformation not presented in the video. For example, an unanswerable question is, 'Whatw as the logo on the perpetrator'ss hirt?' and the perpetrator'ss hirtd id not have al ogo. Questions were presented in the sameorder to all participants and followed the chronological order in which the relevant information appeared in the video. The first threeq uestions were answerable questions selected from the list presented in the Appendix. The next 19 questions were am ix of answerable and unanswerable questions with no consecutive unanswerableq uestions.A lthought hiss tudy focuses onlyo nt he answers to unanswerable questions,a nswerable questions were includeda sw ell so that the participants would taket he task seriously and not be suspiciousa bout natureo ft he questions.
Definitiono ft he other-generated and self-generated conditions In the other-generated condition, all six of the unanswerable questions and six (out of the 16)a nswerable questions includeds uggested answers in the question itself.F or example, an unanswerable question in the other-generated condition asked, 'The type of sodat he co-worker wasd rinking looked like a Coke ;w hat do your emember as the type of soda?' An answerable question asked, 'The colour of the backpackt he victim was carryingl ooked like it was purple;w hat do your emembert he colour to be?' For unanswerable questions,t he suggested answer to each question was the most commonly reported answer to that question produced in the study by Pezdek et al. (2007) . We did this to ensure that the suggested answer wasnot an improbable one. For answerable questions, the other-generated suggested answer wasa lways the correct answer.I nt he self-generated condition, all questions weres tated just as theya re indicated in the Appendix.
Definitiono ff orced guess andv oluntaryg uess conditions Participants in the forced guess condition ( N ¼ 78) were provided written instructions to answer all 22 questions.Theywere instructed not to leave any questions unanswered, and that theys hould maket heir best guess of each answer even if theyw ere unsure. Participants in the forced guess condition werenot given an ' Idon't know ' response option at time 1 .O nt he other hand, participants in the voluntaryg uess condition ( N ¼ 66) were provided written instructions to answer each question, however they were instructed that if theyd id not know an answer theys hould circle the 'I don't know' responseo ption. After each of their 22 responses, participants in all conditions also rated their confidence in the accuracy of their response on a1(low) to 7( high) scale. Participants did not give confidence ratings forq uestions to which they responded, 'I don'tknow.'
One week later at time 2, participants were retested on their memory forthe video. At time 2, participants in all four conditions were provided with the same22questions, but this time all participants weregiven the ' Idon't know ' response option and were instructed to checkt his option if theyd id not know the answer to aq uestion. The 'other-generated' suggested answerswere notincluded on the questionnaire at time 2. Again, participants providedc onfidence ratings fore ach answer provided.
Results
There wasone exclusion criterion. Tenparticipants in the forced guess condition were excluded from the analyses because theyi ndicated 'I don't know' at time 1t oa tl east one of the six unanswerable questions. 1 Of these participants,fi ve were in the selfgenerated conditiona nd five werei nt he other-generated condition. Analyses were performed on the remaining 134 participants ( M age ¼ 22: 7y ears; 51 males;8 3 females).
The analysesfocus on the responses to unanswerable questions. Responses to these questions are especially revealing, as these are the questions that probed information that wasn ot actually presented in the video, and thus any answer provided was confabulated. In the other-generated condition, the other-generated suggested response was provided 8.8% of the time 1responsesinthe voluntaryguess condition and 19.2% of the time 1r esponses in the forced guess condition. Most of the responses to unanswerable questions in the voluntaryg uess conditionw ere responseso f' don't know' at time 1( 75.8% of all responses), and of these, 81.9% receiveda'don't know' responsea tt ime 2a sw ell. Despite the high rate of 'don't know' responsesi nt he voluntaryg uess and even the forced guess condition, we would argue that the results that follow have significant forensic relevance. This is first, because in police interviews, unlikeinthe present study in which participants simply responded to written questions, real witnesses are more likely to be pressuredt oa nswer questions;t heya re consequently less likely to respond that theyd on'tk now the answer to aq uestion. Second, even if our findings areo nly applicablet oaminority of eyewitness cases,i f these result in erroneous convictions or even the obstruction of police investigations, these are serious consequences.
The primaryanalysis addressed the mean proportion of unanswerable questions per subjectt hat were responded to at time 2w ith the self-generated answer in the selfgenerated condition and the other-generated answer in the other-generated condition given that this same answer had been provided by the subject at time 1. The conditional probability fore ach of the four conditions in this study is presented in Table 1. In the study by Pezdek et al. (2007) , the critical results were also analysed in terms of this conditional probability.F our of the 68 participants in the forced guess condition were not includedinthis analysis because theyproduced differentanswers at time 1and time 2toall six unanswerable questions;this analysis is thusconducted on 64 participants in the forced guess condition (35 in the self-generated conditiona nd 29 in the othergenerated condition). In the voluntaryg uess condition only 31 participants (17 in the self-generated condition and 14 in the other-generated condition) gave an answer to at least one unanswerable question (i.e. theyd id not respond,' don't know'). Thisi s comparable to the proportion of participants in the voluntaryg uess conditionw ho responded similarly (56%) in the study by Pezdek et al. (2007) . A2(voluntaryv s. forced guess condition) £ 2( self-vs. other-generated condition) analysis of variance (ANOVA )was conducted on the data in Table 1 . Only the interaction 1 In this study,weexamine in each condition, the pattern of responses at time 2 given that participants provided an answer to eachq uestion at time 1. There are two wayst oa chieve this conditional probability.I ns ome previous studies (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998 ; Zaragoza et al.,2 001) the experimenters made sure that everyone in the forced confabulation condition provided an answer to each question at time 1. Zaragoza et al. (2001) , fore xample,r eported that, 'When participants resisted answering these questions,the experimenter prompted them to provide their best guess (repeatedly,ifnecessary) until they eventually acquiesced'(p. 474). They could do this because eachparticipant wasinterviewed separately.However, in our study individuals participated with other volunteers from their class.S oa lthough participants were instructed to provide a response to everyquestion, and the experimenters walked aroundthe room and reminded participants of this,nonetheless, some participants turned in their protocol without answering all questions.Thus,toexamine the pattern of responses at time 2 given that participants provided an answer to each question at time 1, we had to exclude from the analysis participants in the forced guess condition who indicated, 'I don't know' to any question at time 1.
was marginallys ignificant, F ð 1 ; 95Þ¼3 : 63, p ¼ : 06, h 2 ¼ : 04. If an answer was volunteered at time 1, there was no significant difference between the probability that that answer would be repeated at time 2asafunction of whether the time 1response had been self-generated ( M ¼ 0 : 59) or other-generated ( M ¼ 0 : 54), t ð 29Þ¼0 : 34, p . : 05, d ¼ : 12.Onthe other hand,ifthe time 1answer had been forced, that response was morel ikely to be repeated at time 2i fi th ad been an other-generated response ( M ¼ 0 : 57)r ather than as elf-generated response( M ¼ 0 : 33), t ð 62Þ¼3 : 12, p , : 01, This result suggests that in responding to unanswerable questions, self-generated responses that were spontaneouslyv olunteered at time 1w ere equally likely to be repeated at time 2asother-generated responses that were volunteered at time 1. On the other hand, when forced to guess answers to unanswerable questions,s elf-generated answersw erel ess likely to be repeated at time 2t han other-generated answers. If an unanswerable questionwas respondedtowith an answer at time 1, even though the 'I don't know' responseoption wasavailable at time 2, that question was equally likely to be responded to with the same answer if the participant'stime 1responsewas (a) othergenerated forced ( M ¼ 0 : 57), (b) other-generated volunteered( M ¼ 0 : 54), or (c) selfgenerated volunteered ( M ¼ 0 : 59). In these three conditions, if aq uestion was answered at time 1, the modal responseattime 2was the sameresponse given at time 1. However,f or self-generated responses in the forced guess condition, if aq uestion was answered at time 1, the modal response at time 2was 'I don't know' ( M ¼ 0 : 48) rather than the answer that had been self-generated at time 1( M ¼ 0 : 33).
Analyses of confidence ratings
We next assessed the changei nc onfidence from time 1t ot ime 2i nt he forced guess versus the voluntaryg uess conditions fors elf-versus other-generated answers to unanswerable questions.A2( forced guess vs. voluntaryg uess condition) £ 2(self-vs. other-generated) £ 2(time 1vs. time 2) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted on the confidenced ata (rangei nc onfidence ratings ¼ 1-7). For this analysis we specifically looked at the responses to questions forw hich the sames elf-generated answer was provided at time 1a nd time 2i nt he self-generated condition, and the sameo thergenerated answer was provided at time 1and time 2inthe other-generated condition to see if the confidence expressed in these responses differed across conditions. These data are presented in Table 2 . Note that the sample sizes across the four conditions vary considerably.
Ta ble 1. Mean proportion of unanswerable questions (and standard deviation) that wereresponded to at time 2with the self-generated answerinthe self-generated condition or the other-generated answer in the other-generated condition given that this same answer had been provided at time 1, in the voluntaryversus forced guess conditions Voluntaryguess condition ( N ¼ 31) Forced guess condition ( N ¼ 64)
Self-generated answer Self-generated condition 0.59 (0.41) 0.33 (0.24) Other-generated answer Other-generated condition 0.54 (0.46) 0. 57 (0.39) In this analysis, the other-generated responses that were consistently provided at time 1a nd time 2w ere more confidentlyh eld ( M ¼ 3 : 65) than the self-generated responses ( M ¼ 2 : 74), F ð 1 ; 68Þ¼9 : 27, p , : 01, h These results suggest that when participants repeat an answer at time 2t hat had been confabulated at time 1, their confidence in this answer was higher if it hadb een other-generated than self-generated. In addition, when participants were forced to confabulate answerst ou nanswerable questions,a lthough their confidence in the accuracy of their forced answers was initially low,after 1week, their confidenceinthe answerst hat were repeated was significantly higher -w ithin the confidence range expressed forv oluntarily generated answers. The increase over time in the confidence expressed in repeated forced guess answersoccurred forbothself-generated and othergenerated responses.
The analyses of responses to answerable questions,questions forwhich the relevant information wasp rovided in the video, replicated the comparable effects reported by Pezdek et al. (2007) . No effects involving the self-generated versus other-generated condition were predicted forr esponses to answerable questions,n or were any of the results involving this variable significant.
Discussion
The purposeo ft his study was to assess the relative impact of self-generated versus other-generated misinformation on event memory, specifically under the conditions in which individuals are forced to confabulate answerst ou nanswerable questions.T he results replicate the findings reported by Pezdek et al. (2007) with self-generated postevent information and extend these findings to other-generated post-event information. The results suggest that under the conditions of the present study,o ther-generated forced confabulated information is morel ikely to be incorporated into memoryt han self-generated forced confabulated information. As can be seen in the right column of Table 1 , if an answer to an unanswerable questionwas forcibly confabulated at time 1, that answer was more likely to be repeated at time 2ifithad been other-generated than Ta ble 2. Mean confidence ratings (and standard deviations) for responses to unanswerablequestions that werer esponded to at time 1a nd time 2w ith the self-generated answeri nt he self-generated condition or the other-generated answeri nt he other-generated condition, in the voluntaryv ersus forced guess conditions Self-generated Other-generated self-generated.F urther,t he other-generated answers that were repeated were more confidently held than those that were self-generated, although this was true forboth the voluntaryand forced guess conditions. Thisfinding is important in light of the fact that jurors ( Brigham &B othwell, 1983; Noon &H ollins, 1987) and the courts (Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977; Neil v. Biggers, 1972 /1979 often assume that confident eyewitnesses are accurate eyewitnesses. According to the primaryi nterpretation of how post-event information affects memory, when individuals answer unanswerable questions about at arget event, the answersthat theyprovidebecomeincorporated into their memoryfor the target event.
On asubsequent test then, individuals arelikely to make asource monitoring error and confuset he information in their previousanswerswith information actually observed. Source monitoring errorso ccur when individuals integrate new information abouta n event into their memoryf or the target event, but then do not remember that the new information did not comef rom the originally experienced target event (Johnson, Hashtroudi, &L indsay,1993; Lindsay, 1990) .
Distinguishing between externally and internally generated information represents a specific type of source monitoring known as reality monitoring (Johnson &Raye, 1981) . In studies of reality monitoring, it has been reported that individuals are more accurate differentiating betweeno ne external information source and one internal information source than between two external information sources (Raye&Johnson, 1980) . According to Johnson and Raye( 1981) , this is because externally generated memories typically includem ore sensoryi nformation than do internally generated memories. Thus, discriminating between an externally generated memorya nd an internally generated memorys hould be relatively easy because the former will typically be accompanied by more sensoryi nformation than the latter.H owever,b ecause two externally generated memories typically cannot be differentiated on this general dimension, individuals would have to assess the content of the information and not just the sensoryqualities to assess source. Becausethis is amoredifficulttask,morereality monitoring error would likely result.
This would suggest in the present study that the self-generated forced confabulated information would be easier to discriminate from the information in the originally viewed target event. Thus, at time 2, the self-generated answer forced at time 1would less likely be repeated and the 'I don't know' responseo ption would more likely be indicated.Consequently,event memorywas less likely to be suggestivelyinfluenced by the self-generatedi nformation. On the otherh and,t he other-generatedf orced confabulated information would be more similar to and thush ardert od iscriminate from the information in the target event. The source of presented information and othergenerated information would more likely be confused and thus memoryf or the presented event would more likely be suggestivelyi nfluenced by the other-generated information.T his prediction fitst he obtained patterno fr esults in the forced confabulation conditionwith unanswerable questions in the present study.
Another factor that would come into play and explain why self-generated items are more memorable and less likely to be confused with presented items is the 'recollect-toreject'p rocess (Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, &M ojardin, 2003; Rotello, Macmillan, &V an Tassel, 2000) .A ccording to the recollect-to-reject process,i ndividuals use metaknowledget or eason, 'I remember that Ig enerated the words "Coke" whenIw as forced to guess, so Iknow that it was not something that Isaw'. The generated items in the selfgenerated, forced guess condition are those to which individuals are likely to have devoted more cognitive effort.A ccordingly,t hese are the items more likely to be remembered and thusmore likely to lead to accurate recollect-to-reject reasoning. As a consequence,the self-generated items in the forced guess condition were less likely to be repeated at time 2.
This study examined the extent to which the researcho no ther-generated postevent information canb eg eneralized to real world situationst hat involves elfgenerated post-event information. Self-generated forced confabulation might occur (a) when individuals are encouragedtoimagine atraumatic event of which theyappear to have no memoryo r( b) when eyewitnesses are pressedt od escribee vents that the interviewer believed occurred, even whenw itnesses report that theyc annot remember the event or reportthat theydid not even witnessthe event. The results of this study suggest that althoughself-generated forced confabulation does occur,f orced confabulations are morel ikely to be produced by other-generated than self-generated information.N umerous methodologiesh ave been used to experimentally induce selfgenerated misinformation (cf. Mazzonni &M emon, 2003; Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Gabbay, 2006) .C ertainly there may be conditions under which it is possible to produce self-generated forced confabulations that affect memory more than some other conditions that produce other-generated forced confabulations. However,w hen comparable conditions were includedi nt he present study,s elf-generated forced confabulations were less likely to suggestivelyi nfluence event memory than othergenerated confabulations.
Are generalizations from this study to forensic interviews likely to be constrained by the fact that most of the questions that we asked participants weren ot actuallya bout the car-jacking itself, but rather about the victim and details from the video that preceded the crime? We would argue, no. First, from acognitive point of view,there is no reason to suggest that forced confabulation of information would differentially affect memoryf or crime-relevant versus crime-neutral information.I nf act, in the study by Yuille and Cutshall (1986) , AC ase Study of Eyewitness Memoryo faCrime ,r eal witnesses to ashooting were questioned about three types of memoryt hat differed in forensic relevance:what occurred; person descriptions; and object descriptions. Similar patterns of results were reported across these three types of memory, some of which were crime-relevant and some crime-neutral. Similar findings were reported by Fahsing, Ask, and Granhag (2004) concerning offender descriptions by 250 witnesses to actual bank robberies.
Second, it is often difficulttotell in advance what the forensicallyrelevant details will be in any particular case. For example, in the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, thousands of people werequestioned by the FBI about whether theyhad seenayellow Ryder truck on the streets of Oklahoma City.Itislikely that these people had seen hundreds of carsand trucks in the days preceding the bombing. And, in the case of People of the StateofCalifornia v. Sara Jane Olson, the eyewitness was linked to the case because he claimed to have remembered afemale, who had accompanied a male who had purchased ap articular pipefi tting seven weeks prior in his plumbing supply store. This fitting was the type that had been used in the 1975 attempted bombing of aL os Angelesp olice car by the Symbionese Liberation Army that claimed Patty Hearst as am ember.T he forensic relevance of memory forayellow Ryder truck and memory foraspecific pipefitting would have been difficult to predict in advance. Wright et al. (2000) have made this samea rgument and called forr esearchu sing a broader rangeo fs timuli in eyewitness memoryr esearch. Even so, the findingsi nt his study were based on peripheraldetails;additional researchisnecessary to assess if more central details can be changed in asimilar fashion.
There are caveats to consider.First, there may be limits in generalizing the findings from any researchs etting to the realw orld context of forensic interviewing due to procedural and contextual differences. This includes the fact that the recalled event in this study was less emotional and less personally relevant than are the typicale vents recalled in police interviews. Second,because the suggestions made in this study were conveyed in written text rathert han face-to-face interviews, the results of this study probably present ac onservative estimate of the degree of forced confabulation that is likely to occur in real police interviews.
Nonetheless,the results of this study and those of Pezdek et al. (2007) suggest that when interviewing eyewitnesses, investigatorss hould be especially careful not to suggest information to the eyewitnesses. Pressuring eyewitnesses to answer questions when theyindicate that theydonot knowthe answer can result in false confabulation, especially if the investigator suggests as pecific answer to the eyewitness. Answers suggested by the investigator are more likely to be repeated later than are answersthat were simplyself-generated or speculated by the eyewitness, and these other-generated answersa re likely to be more confidently held.
